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AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: A CASE STUDY ON THE
CREDIT PROGRAMME FOR TRACTORIZATION OF SMALL
SCALE AGRICULTURE IN MOROGORO REGION
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ABSTRACT As in most developing countries, in Tanzania, agricultural credit is consid-
ered an important factor in stimulating agricultural production, particularly among small
farmers. This paper provides the findings from a study on a formal agricultural credit pro-
gramme sponsored by the government in Morogoro Region. The credit programme supplied
tractors to small farmers in the region to improve production. Through a field survey con-
ducted among small farmers who received the credit, it was found that the performance of
the credit programme was below the expected level because of insufficient examination of
the socioeconomic situation of the farms and lack of provision of supportive service to the
programme.
Key Words: Morogoro Region: Agricultural credit; Tractorization; Agriculture and rural
development.
INTRODUCTION
In most developing countries, agricultural credit has been considered an impor-
tant factor for increased agricultural production and rural development. However,
the provision of credit to the rural sector in these countries has experienced a
number of problems. The first major problem has been that because most develop-
ing countries face a shortage of lending funds. they tend to depend heavily on exter-
nal funds from donor agencies or governments to implement their credit program-
mes. Secondly, most rural credit programmes have not been able to reach the poor
small farmers they are intended to help, and instead, are diverted to richer, big
farmers. In a study on problems of agriculture credit in Bangladesh, for example.
Adams & Nelson (1979) found that about 85% of credit for agricultural produc-
tion had actually gone to tea producers and large-scale rich farmers. The third ma-
jor problem has been the failure of these institutions to recover most of their ad-
vanced credit. Adams & Nelson (1979) found that in Bangladesh, loan recovery
was as low as 35%. In Tanzania, the average recovery rate by the main bank len-
ding to the agricultural sector. the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank
(CRDB), has been about 45% (CRDB Report, 1990/91). These arc just a few of
the numerous problems which have impaired the success of rural credit.
The existence of so many problems in rural credit has led to a widely held view
that formal credit programmes in developing countries cannot achieve their objec-
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tives. Evidence, however, shows that there are quite a number of successful ex-
perience in rural credit, particularly, when credit programmes are accompanied
with adequate supportive programmes. Von Pischke & Rouse (1983) have provided
six examples of successful credit programmes in Morocco, Kenya, Cameroon,
Zimbabwe and Malawi. They contend that the programmes were successful, owing
to appropriate policies designed to suit specific circumstances in rural areas. In
fact, the degree of success of any credit programme depends very much on the ex-
tent the programme addresses itself to local conditions.
The paper examines the design, implementation and performance of rural credit













































Fig, 1. Location of the study area.
Agricultural Credit in Tanzania








































Source: Field Study, 1992.
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Morogoro Region. It examines the background to the project, its implementation,
the outcomes and overall performance of the programme. The main objective is to
draw out the valuable experiences from this project, by identifying its strengths
and weaknesses, for the benefit of future rural credit programmes in Tanzania.
The assessment is based on a farm level study conducted at different periods, be-
tween mid 1991 and September 1992, for a total period of five months.
The Morogoro Region Tractorization Project covered all the districts in
Morogoro Region. One hundred and fifty tractors were supplied by project funds
to be issued on credit to farmers. Morogoro Urban District received 37 tractors,
Morogoro Rural District. 40 tractors, Kilosa District, 53 tractors, Kilombero
District, 13 tractors, and Ulanga District. 7 tractors. The study was conducted in
Morogoro Rural and Kilosa Districts, which received 62% of the credit tractors dis-
tributed in the region. A field survey was conducted in selected villages, namely
Wami-Daka\va, Magole, l'vlvomero, Mgongola, Mkindo, Dumila, Madudu and
l'vItumbatu, which were covered by the credit facility (Fig. I).
Recipients of the credit facility were categorized into three groups, of indi-
viduals, cooperatives and village governments, so as to examine the differences in
outcomes among these groups. A total of 22 recipients of the credit tractors were
covered by the study (Table I).
Random sampling was used to select respondents from the three groups. In the
case of individual borrowers, the borrower was the respondent. Among coopera-
tives and village governments, the chairman was the respondent. More informa-
tion, particularly on credit borrowed by the fourth group, distriCt councils, was ob-
tained by informal discussions "ith relevant authority and personal observation by
the researcher. However, district councils were nor included in Table 1 because the
preliminary study showed that by the time of the study, all tractors owned by
Morogoro and Kilosa district councils were not operating and no proper records
were available. During the actual field survey therefore, district councils were not
sampled.
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BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRACTORIZATION
CREDIT PROGRAMME IN MOROGORO REGION
I. Background to the Programme
Tanzania's agricultural production. particularly food production, suffered
serious setbacks in the early 1980s, forcing the government to import large quan-
tities of food to compensate for production deficits. Figure 2 portrays the situation
of the two main staples in the country, maize and rice, in terms of national pur-
chases and imports, between 1975/76 and 1985/86.
There was a sharp decline in national procurements of both maize and rice be-
tween 1980/8 I and 1983/84. The decline was more pronounced in maize, forcing
the government to step up imports of both staples. There was an urgent need to in-
crease domestic food production, especially of maize and rice. It was then thought
that the increase in production could be achieved by a rapid introduction of trac-
torization credit to small scale individual farmers and groups of farmers who
lacked capital to purchase farm machinery to increase production and also to ex-
pand the area under cultivation.
The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, therefore. requested
assistance from Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), who, within the
framework of its agreement with the Government of Italy, agreed to introduce a
tractorization project in Morogoro Region. The farmers would be provided with
credit to enable them purchase the tractors. The region was chosen, because it was
identified as a production deficit region with a high potential for mechanized farm-
ing.
In March 1985, the government of Italy provided US$ 5. I million, for technical
assistance and machinery to be utilized as credit for mechanizing small-scale
agicultural production in Tanzania between 1985 and 1986. The project provided
150 FIAT tractors each with a disc plough, a harrow and a trailer, plus 20 planters
and 20 chisel ploughs, supplied in two phases. The project also included the estab-
lishment of a service workshop in Morogoro to provide tools, basic spare parts,
vehicles and training for mechanics to service the tractors and machinery. The
credit project was to cease operation at the end of 1990, when farmers were ex-
pected to be able to sustain tractorization on their own and operate profitably.
Within the broad objective of the credit facility to accelerate food production in
the country, particular emphasis ,vas put on tractorization of rice and maize pro-
duction. Specific objectives, according to records obtained from the project office
in Morogoro, included the following:
(1) To demonstrate farmers the appropriate selection, application and manage-
ment of machinery as a means to increase production on their farms.
(2) To demonstrate to farmers and government personnel the crucial importance of
the mechanization introduced under tbe credit facility and its maintenance by the
individuals and groups of farmers.
(3) To demonstrate the means of sustaining the programme through proper, and
well-organized, and well-managed credit facility, training of users, and services for
the supply, maintenance and repair of equipment.
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II. The Regional l'vlechanisms for Agricultural Credit Disbursement
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As in all other regions in Tanzania, the provision of agricultural credit to small
farmers in Morogoro Region had grown rapidly. particularly after the government
established the first rural lending bank in 1971. The bank. Tanzania Rural Develop-
ment Bank (TRDB), changed its name to Cooperative and Rural Development
Bank (CRDB) in 1984, in an apparent move to expand lending to small farmers
through farmer cooperatives. Also financing the rural sector are the National Bank
of Commerce, (NBC), Tanzania Investment Bank (TlB) and the Tanzania Hous-
ing Bank (THB), though their roles are smaller.
l\'lost credit for small farmers in Morogoro Region is provided by the regional
branch of the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB). The regional
branch has two lines of credit, namely, short-term credit and long-term credit. The
short-term credit facility, for durations of up to 18 months, is mostly used to
finance the supply of seasonal inputs and the provision of overdrafts for crop pro-
curement. This credit is provided to small farmers through their respective coopera-
tive unions. which submit farmers applications for credit to the regional branch of
the CRDB. at least three months before the season starts. These applications are
scrminized by the regional branch, and forwarded to the head office, depending on
the amount applied for. The head office, which in most cases lacks adequate funds
to finance all the requirements, may apply for credit from the larger commercial
bank. the National Bank of Commerce, or the Central Bank. When the credit is
secured, the same channel is followed down to the farmer. In the case of input
credit, the inputs are purchased by the CRDB and passed to the farmer through
their cooperatives. Crop procurement credit is usually provided to the cooperative
unions, but with recent liberalization of crop procurement, individuals may also di-
rectly obtain the credit.
All credit facilities for regional agricultural projects, therefore, are fonvarded to
farmers through the respective CRDB regional branches, which then supervise the
utilization of the credit as well as its recovery. The Morogoro Region Tractoriza-
tion Credit, which is the focus of this study, is one such credit facility.
Ill. Implementation of the Credit Programme
The Ministry of Agriculture and the CRDB were directly responsible for the im-
plementation of the rvlorogoro Region Tractorization Credit Project. The ministry
and the bank cooperated with the FAD office in Tanzania. The ministry set up a
project office at Morogoro which worked very closely with the CRDB Morogoro
branch which handled the credit facility. While the bank concentrated more on
credit aspects, the project office concentrated on technical aspects of tractoriza-
tion. The CRDB was commissioned to sell the tractors on credit on behalf of the
government, On the agreement that the government will pay a 2.5% commission
fee and share the interest accruing from the credit. Interest charged on the credit
was 20.5% per year. Proceeds from the sale of tractors were used to establish a
counterpart fund, which would be used to provide other supporting services to the
credit project, such as fertilizer, construction of rural tractor service centers, and
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Table 2. Distribution of Phase I and II credit tractors by district in l\lorogoro region.
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the procurement of spare tractor parts.
Successful applicants were to pay to the CRDB, the market price of the tractor,
TShs 440,000, equivalent to US$ 19,753. for Phase I tractors. The price rose to
TShs 960,000 for Phase II tractors, due to the devaluation of the Tanzanian shil-
ling. Individual borrowers paid a down payment of 50% of the tractor cost. while
cooperative borrowers paid a 25 % dO\\TI payment. Interest was charged on the re-
maining after a 2-year grace period.
Project tractors were distributed to successful applicants in all districts, but of
the 150 tractors, 93 went to IVi0rogoro Rural and Kilosa Districts. Overall distribu-
tion is shown in Table 2.
As for the distribution by category of borrower. 84 tractors (56%) were distri-
buted to individuals. 34 tractors (23%) to villages. 20 tractors (13%) to coopera-
tives and 12 tractors (8%) to district councils. More tractors went to individuals
because it was agreed between the government and the donors to basically favour
individual borrowers on the expectation that credit discipline would be higher
among individual borrowers. The project was to cease operation in 1990, but as of
July 1992, the project office was still involved in the supply of agricultural inputs,
tractor spare parts as well as monitoring and training of project tractor owners.
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAMME: ACHIEVEMENTS, PRO-
BLEMS AND WEAKNESSES
1. General Achievements
(I) Knowledge and experience gained by farmers and staff involved in the project
The first major achievement of the credit programme is the knowledge and ex-
perience gained by both the credit staff and the farmers who benefitted from the
credit facility. There were 11 head office staff plus 5 field staff involved in the day-
to-day handling of the project. All project staff members received training in ma-
chinery repair and maintenance. as well as credit supervision and monitoring. One
head office staff member was granted scholarship for further training in Italy, and







two others were scheduled to receive COurses abroad on information processing
using computers. Also, 69 agricultural extension staff were trained in the general
operation of machinery, and data collection to support the mechanization pro-
gramme.
Weekly project appraisal panels, which involved the Regional Agricultural
Office, the Project Office, CRDB and the Regional Development Director's office,
convened on a regular basis. The panels evaluated the project performance, prob-
lems and strategies. These discussions were a good means of exchanging ideas on
problems and better methods for credit management.
(2) The provision of tractors and seasonal inputs to farmers on credit
The second major achievement was the availability of tractors, to those who ob-
tained the credit. The tractors were used in ploughing and also provided transporta-
tion, which, although not a primary objective of the project, provided a service
which was in demand in the rural areas. Spare parts for tractors as well as other
project vehicles worth about TShs 36.9 million were also supplied under the pro-
ject (Table 3).
Farm inputs worth about TShs 27 million were also issued on credit farmers in
the region (Table 4).
(3) Construction of farm service centers and improvement of rural access roads
During the course of the project, five farm service centers to service tractors were
constructed at Kilengezi. Kanseli, Mikoche-Mitatu, Wami-Dakawa, and Manyenyere
villages. Construction of rural feeder roads, as well as bridges at various locations
Table3. Spare pans imported by the Morogoro Region Project Office, 1990-1991.
Type of Spare Parts Value in USS (elF DSM) Value in TShs (X 1(00)
I. 120 pcs. Tractor rear
tyres with tubes 41,042.30
2. Tractor pans 111,753.12
3. Other machinery pans 18,857.54
4. Vehicle pans 11,200.6
5. l\IolOrcycle parts 6,710.61
Total 189,3g4.17
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1992.
Table 4. Seasonal inputs loan disbursement and repayment position as at the end of
1991/92 season ('000 TShs).























(4) General increase in area under cultivation
Another overall achievement was a general increase in the area cultivated in the
region following the introduction of the tractorization programme. Table 5 shows
the expansion of the regional area under cultivation from the 1985/86 season to
1989/90 season (Table 5).
Table 5. Area under cultivation in Ivlorogoro Region, 1985/86 to 1989/90.
Season Number of Tractors Planned (ha) Actual (ha)
1985/86 100 15,360 16,768
1986/87 150 24,000 19,333
1987/88 150 24,000 22,464
1988/89 141 24,000 17,353
1989/90 140 21,000 15,813







The general increase in area under cultivation. although below the target in all
seasons. except in the 1985/86 season, may be a good indication of a positive im-
pact of the credit on farming. Although the increase in area under cultivation may
have been brought about by factors other than the credit tractors, their positive
contribution can be justified by the fact that the peaks for area under cultivation oc-
curred in 1986/87 and 1987/88, the time when the tractors were in prime condition.
In 1986/87, the period when the project had just started, the total area under culti-
vation was very low. Then after 1987/88, the total area under cultivation started to
decline when the tractors started to break down due to poor management.
II. I\Iajor Problems and Weaknesses of the Credit Programme
Despite the general achievements of the credit programme discussed above, the
study revealed a number of problems as well as weaknesses in the credit pro-
gramme. which originated from its design as well as implementation. These are dis-
cussed below:
I. Major Problems
(1) Poor maintenance of credit tractors
Almost all credit tractors, particularly those not maintained by individuals were
poorly maintained, with no proper record keeping. The study found that most of
these tractors were completely out of order after 2 to 3 years of use, well below the
projected durability of 6 years. This also led to a high rate of loan default. The
failure to repay the credit and weakness in managing tractors issued to villages and
district councils was well shown by records on tractors repossessed by the project
office. Five tractors, which belonged to Kisaki-Kibaoni village, Mkindo village,
Morogoro District Council and Kidugobasi village, were repossessed. The fifth trac-
tor belonged to an individual. During the time of this study, operational tractors
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belonged mostly to individuals. However, most individuals who still owned trac-
tors were villagers who were large-scale farmers with farms of about 30 ha or more,
compared to ordinary small farmers in the area whose plots were 0.5 to 1.5 ha.
Most small farmers who obtained tractors had either abandoned or sold them.
(2) Poor loan repayment
There was a generally poor loan repayment associated with the project. Records
in the project office showed that, of the 50 borrowers of Phase II tractors, 20 fin-
ished paying their credit on time, while 30 had yet to repay their loans. This is only
a 40% repayment rate. Tractor owners blamed their inability to repay loans on low
returns from tractors, late repayment for produce by cooperatives, high tractor
running costs and delays in the repair of equipment. For Phase I tractors, however,
repayment was a high 61.3%. While loan repayment was considered a problem by
67% of owners of Phase II tractors, it was considered so by only 36% owners of
Phase I tractors. This disparity may be explained by the fact the price of Phase II
tractor supplied just a year later was more than twice that of Phase I tractors, as
mentioned above.
The poor loan repayment prompted the project office to repossess the five trac-
tors mentioned above. By the time of this study, 10 more tractors were due for
repossession for the same reason. Among these belonged to small farmers, 2 to
village governments and 3 to cooperatives.
The repayment of seasonal inputs supplied under the project was also low. By
(he end of 1991/92 season, of the total inputs credit of about TShs 27 million pro-
vided, only TShs 11.3 million was repaid. This represents a low 41.7% repayment
rate (Table 4).
(3) Inability by owners to sustain tractorization
Most owners were unable to sustain tractorization in the absence of further
credit. When owners with still operational tractors were asked if they could replace
their tractors without further credit, 62% said they could not, while 38% said they
could. High tractor costs, coupled with high tractor running costs and delays in re-
pairs to equipment were the most frequent reasons given by interviewed owners.
Late delivery or lack of necessary inputs, followed by low prices for farm produce
was also frequently cited as contributing factors.
(4) Diversion in use and resale of borrowed tractors
In surveyed villages, the few project tractors still operational were mostly being
used for transporting people rather than farming. Among surveyed owners, trans-
port accounted for 78% of (ractor use on average. 73% indicated that they profited
more from transportation than from farming, due to low ploughing fees set by the
regional government. The government set the tractor hire cost at TShs 4,000 to
5,000 (l US$=TShs 400) per hour for ploughing during the 1991/92 season. When
the tractor is used for transport, which has no government set fee, between TShs
80-160 were charged per km per ton. Most tractors can carry up to 5 tons. So if (he
tractor transports 5 tons at a moderate speed of 20 km/hr, one makes between
TShs 8,000 to 16,000 an hour, which is clearly better (han when hired for farming.
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The alternative of using tractors to plough one's own farms is limited by the fact
that most farms are small, and not sufficient for the effective utilization of a tractor
of the size provided by the project. Therefore, from this analysis, it is more
lucrative for the farmers to use the tractor for transportation rather than farming.
This shows that the regional government could not foresee the fact that too Iowa
ploughing rate would divert the use of tractors to an alternative, defeating the
original objective of providing the tractors.
According to the Ministry of Agriculture (1992), a considerable number of trac-
tors have been sold secretly to third parties by borrowers, sometimes outside the re-
gion. The exact number of tractors sold to third parties was, however, not avail-
able.
(5) Inavailability and high cost of spare parts
There was also the problem of the inavailability and high cost of spare parts for
the tractors. About 50% of the grounded tractors were grounded just because of
worn-out rear tyres. Although recently Tanzania has undertaken extensive import
liberalization, the tyres are said to be unavailable in the free market or too expen-
sive. A rear tractor tyre costs about TShs 400,000 (about US$ 1,000) in the free
market. which most tractor owners said they cannot afford. Although the official
price for government imported rear tyre is TShs 200.000, the government is unable
to satisfy the demand. Tractor owners also showed reluctance in taking their trac-
tors to the project appointed official agents for repairs. because the service
workshop was too far away in Morogora town, and also feared that parts would be
stolen from their tractors. Tractors owners preferred mechanics to repair their trac-
tors in their presence. but this could only be possible if there were enough mechan-
ics to visit farmers and the breakdowns were only minor ones. This claimed can-
nibalism. however, could not be verified. but many tractors owners continued to
use their tractors. even when they had mechanical problems. The farm service
centers built by the project and then handed over to the district and village govern-
ments were hardly used, due to the lack of technicians as well as a general lack of
equipment and spare parts.
2. Weakness of the Project
The problems experienced in the credit programme were largely associated with
weaknesses in project design. There were some problems beyond the project's con-
trol, such as the 1989190 tloods in the region which resulted in poor harvests and
consequent failure by farmers to honour their credit commitments. However such
occurrences were few. The major weaknesses of the credit programme mainly
arose from the following factors:
(1) Incompatibility between tractorization and size of farms
Most farmers in the project area own farms too small to profitably utilize a large
tractor. Although a typical farmer may own more than two small farms at different
locations. the total area is still inadequate for a tractor. According to the study,
most farmers own between 2 and 6 farming plots, situated between 10 km to 20 km
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from their homes. Approximately 47% of farmers lived within 10 km of their
farms, while the rest lived farther away. Areas of farms range between 0.4 ha to
0.75 ha, while total farm sizes in the study villages ranged from 1.6 to 4.5 ha.
Despite this broad variation, however, the study found the average total size of
farms to be only about 2 ha. These areas are too small for effective utilization of 70
horsepower tractor, which requires only 5 hours to plough such an area. In such a
farming system, therefore, a tractor will most probably be underutilized. unless it
is hired out to plough other farms. Hiring out tractors. however, as already
pointed out, is very unprofitable. According to most borrowers, to keep the tractor
properly utilized, one needs at least 30 ha. Such large farms are not common in the
area.
(2) Inadequate farmer knowledge and experience on tractor management
Most farmers in the study showed that they lacked knowledge and experience in
tractor management. This lead to the rapid depreciation of the tractors, most of
which were out of operation only after 2 to 3 years. According to the Ministry of
Agriculture (1991), the durability of a tractor in Morogoro region was known to be
6 years, but may be as long as 9 years with good maintenance. The rapid deprecia-
tion might have been caused by a combination of factors, but lack of proper trac-
tor operating skills as well as inadequate maintenance have been the major causes.
The project office in Morogoro conducted some short-term courses for tractor
operation and maintenance at Morogoro, aimed at introducing borrowers to basic
tractor management. However, the enrollment did not strictly target borrowers, to
the assumption that anybody could be trained and then hired by the borrowers to
operate the tractors. Most non-tractor owners who received the training, however,
hardly operated project tractors due to low salaries. Information obtained from
the study shows that borrowed tractors were poorly maintained, resulting in a high
rate of depreciation (Fig. 2).
Findings, showed that, depreciation costs accounted for about 46%(1) of tractor
operating costs. This fact is well reflected in the low expenditure on repair and
maintenance, only 4.6% of total operating costs. According to Kramer (1991),
depreciation costs accounted for about 7.3% of tractor operating costs in devel-
oped countries, due to better skill and superior management, but in the developing
countries, repair and maintenance accounted for about 10% of the total cost,
much higher than the 4.6%.
(3) Indivisibility of the credit
The credit was tied to the tractor, an innovation which was too expensive to pur-
chase, and also indivisible. As shown above, in this project, prospective owners
were required to raise a down payment of 25% of the cost of the tractor in the case
of cooperatives and 50% for individuals. Thus, an individual farmer was supposed
to be able to pay about TShs 220,000 for Phase I tractors or TShs 480,000 for
Phase II tractors as down payments. Such high initial costs, although justified
given the cost of the tractors, were already prohibitive to the ordinary small
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Fig. 2. National purchases and imports of maize and rice. 1975;;6 to 1985/86 in Tanzania. (Source:
I\linistry of Agriculture, United Republic of Tanzania, 1990).
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Fig. 3. Distribution of tractor operating costs among sampled owners (Source: Field Study, 1992).
(4) Lack of farmers' involvement in the planning and implementation of the credit
project
The Morogoro Region Tractorization Credit Programme was intended to trans-
fer technology to the small farner. Since technology transfer is highly sensitive to
social, economic political, and, of course, technical factors, it is also necessary to
involve farmers in the planning and implementation of the project, apart from the
need to involve specialists in these areas. This is important not only because
farmers are the ones who know their environment best, but also because their par-
ticipation is crucial in their embracement of the project.
The rvlorogoro farmers were absent from the start of the project. The regional
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committee, for example, which was involved in the planning and implementation
of the project had no farmer representatives. This deprived the committee of im-
portant information about the farmers and their social environment.
(5) Lack of proper evaluation of borrowers credit-worthiness
Credit tractors which were allocated to villages and small scale farmers were
allocated mainly due to political pressure, rather than actual demand and ability to
utilize tractors profitably. For example, it was learnt from the study that most
villages which had borrowed tractors did so because they were told by local govern-
ment authorities that they had been allocated a tractor, even though they had not
applied for one. As most of the villages were unable to raise the required down
payments, district governments provided the villages with the down payments,
which were never repaid. For example, of the 4 villages covered by the study, 2
villages (Magole and Dumila) received their down payments from the district
office, and up to now, the sums have not been repaid to the district office. There
was also evidence from interviewed borrowers that the credit was received without
prior consultations on how to use the borrowed tractors. Seventeen out of the 22 in-
terviewed borrowers (77 .3%) indicated that they had neither prior intention to pur-
chase a tractor nor plants on how to use a tractor if they could get one by credit.
Their commitment for credit was borne simply because it became available.
(6) Lack of adequate supportive services to the credit programme
The success of any credit programme depends highly on the quality as well as
quantity of support it gets from other relevant sources. Such support ranges from
crop marketing, crop pricing, input supply and delivery. research, extension, irriga-
tion, crop protection to infrastructural support, which include rural trans-
portation, crop storage, and processing. Most of these support services in the study
area were found to be either inadequate or too poor to facilitate smooth operation
of the credit programme as discussed below:
a. Inadequate institutional support:
The marketing system in the area in particular was unsatisfactory. Interviewed
members of the Jembe Mali primary cooperative societies at Mvomero, were yet to
receive payments for their previous season's crop, apparently because the National
Milling Corporation (NMC), a public parastatal which used to enjoy a monopoly
on grain procurement, was unable to pay immediately. Most primary cooperatives
visited were found to have management problems. There are quite a number of
them that run without proper record keeping, especially due to lack of knowledge
on bookkeeping among cooperative staff. Although recently the government has
allowed private individuals to buy crops directly from farmers at free market prices.
most private traders do not go to remote villages. This means that farmers in such
villages have to depend on cooperatives, who buy at government-fixed producer
prices that remain low, compared to increases in prices of agricultural inputs and
tractor maintenance costs parts as shown in Figure 4.
In Figure 4, taking 1985/86 as the base year, the price indices show that producer
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Fig. 4. Tanzania: Indices for price development, I985/86 to 1990/91 (Source: lvlinistry of Agriculture,
Unilcd Republic of Tanzania, 1990; Bank of Tanzania, 1991 l.
prices of machinery, machinery replacement parts, as well as prices of other agri-
cultural inputs. It is noteworthy that, by 1990/91, prices of machinery, and their re-
placement parts had risen to almost 1,300% and 950%, respectively, while pro-
ducer prices for rice and maize increased by a low 450% and 250%, respectively.
b. Weak infrastructural support:
Apart from the failure to match crop prices with the cost of tractorization and
agricultural inputs, rural access roads, remain poor, making crop transportation
from rural areas difficult. Crop storage facilities in the area also insufficient, and
on the farm, processing facilities have largely been ignored. In the study areas,
\Vami-Dakawa, Magole Mkindo and Mtumbatu, the few storage godowns looked
unmaintained and abandoned, while some maize processing machines. maize
shellers, supplied by the project have been abandoned, due to lack of spare parts.
c. Inadequate utilization of lacal technical capabilities:
There was lack of coordination between the credit office and technical institu-
tions in the area, such as Sokoine University of Agriculture and the llonga Agri-
cultural Research Institute. The project office seems not to be keen about seeking
technical advice from these institutions both before and during the project.
Sokoine University, for example, is quite capable of conducting feasibility studies
on social as well as economic aspects in rural areas, but it was not contacted by the
project office for such a study or advice. The quality of extension in the area is also
not only weak, but uncoordinated with the credit system. The extension service
under the Ministry of Agriculture is not utilized by the credit system in advising
farmers on how to use their borrowed tractors.
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The credit program for tractorization in Morogoro region was initiated with
much emphasis on rapid increases in agricultural production, without careful
assessment of the necessary conditions for its success. It was also characterized by
the lack of farmer participation and poor utilization of local institutions. Farmers,
who could have provided useful information regarding their localities were not in-
volved. Local institutions, Sokoine University of Agriculture and the Ilonga Agri-
cultural Research Center, which have adequate capabilities to conduct field evalua-
tions were not even consulted on such important issues. These, together with poor
implementation, resulted in the unsatisfactory performance of the credit pro-
gramme.
As seen in this study, most small farmers could not afford the credit due to its
high initial cost, while the innovation tied to the credit did not have much to con-
tribute to the farm production in the area. As a result, it failed to reach the intend-
ed small farmers and was sometimes misdirected to serve other purposes such as
transportation. The weaknesses inherent in the design of the credit programme led
to poor loan repayment and the failure to attain the expected level of agricultural
change.
The Morogoro Region Tractorization Credit Programme could have been more
successful if it was attached to an innovation which was more simple, divisible and
applicable to a wider number of small farmers in the region. The important lesson
gained from this credit programme, therefore, is, that the success of any rural
credit programme depends highly on its applicability to the economy it is intended
to improve.
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NOTES
(1) Depreciation is calculated by the formulum D=PP-SV
ELT
Where: D = Depreciation
PP = Purchase Price
SV=Salvage Value (10% PP)
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